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YOUTH-A SCARCE COMMODITY
WITHIN AN AGEING WORLD
SARAH HARPER*
The United Nations has recently identified Global Popula-
tion Aging as one of the key challenges facing the world this cen-
tury.' The global challenge concerns a fundamental shift in the
population structure of the world. Over this coming century, the
age composition of nearly every country is expected to move
from one of mainly young people to one in which the number of
older adults will outnumber the young. It is expected that by
2050 the number of people over age sixty will reach two billion,
when the percentage over sixty will have reached more than a
fifth of the total global population (21%).2 The numbers of
those aged eighty and above will show an even greater increase,
rising from eighty-six million to an incredible 394 million by
2050.
By 2030, that is, within less than twenty-five years, half the
population of Western Europe will be aged over fifty, with a life
expectancy at fifty of some forty further years.4 That is, half
Europe's population will be aged between fifty and ninety. This
is historically unprecedented; never before have human beings
lived in societies that have so many more old than young people.
At the same time a quarter of the population of the developed
world will be over sixty-five, including 25% of the European
Union, 19% of the United States, and 30% of Japan.5 In addi-
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tion, one quarter of the population of Asia will be aged over
sixty.6
Taking the world's oldest countries at the turn of the twenti-
eth century measured by the proportion of the population aged
sixty-five and over in 2000, with the exception of Japan, the top
twenty all are European.'
Globally, Italy has the highest proportion of persons aged
65 years and over, a consequence of its low fertility
levels .... Of the European Union countries, Italy at 18.2
per cent has the highest proportion of older people while
Ireland at 11.2 per cent has the lowest. Australia, Canada,
and the United States are at the lower end of this scale with
between 12 and 13 per cent of their populations aged 65
and over. Interestingly, even the former Eastern European
countries have higher percentages than Canada, Australia
and the USA. However, these proportions represent very
different numbers of older people. The largest elderly
population in the developed world is in the USA, with 35
million people aged over 65 . . . followed by Japan with
nearly 23 million . . . and Germany with around 13
million .... 8
To reiterate, while the United States remains a relatively young
developed world population, with currently only 12% of its popu-
lation over sixty-five, it has the largest number of old people in
the developed world.9
A society's median age, that is, the age that divides the popu-
lation into numerically equal parts of younger and older people,
provides another measure. All the countries in the developed
world have median ages over age thirty-two.' ° Highest in Europe
is Italy with 42.3 whilst Japan has 42.9.11 The European Union's
medium age is forty. 12 The Asian countries of Singapore, Hong
Kong, and Korea are now all over thirty-five. 13 In comparison,
the United States is a relatively young developed world nation,
with a median age of thirty-five for men and thirty-eight for
women.' 4 Median ages, however, will increase markedly in some
6. See U.N. World Population Prospects 2004, supra note 1, at 53-57.
7. HARPER, supra note 4, at 4.
8. Id. at 3-4.
9. Id. at 4.
10. Id. at 9.
11. U.N. World Population Prospects 2004, supra note 1, at 58.
12. See id. at 59-63.
13. See id.
14. See HARPER, supra note 4, at 10 (showing that the median age for both
sexes in the United States was thirty-six in 2000).
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countries over the next quarter century. Italy, Brazil, China,
Mexico, and Thailand, for example, will all experience more
than a ten year increase in median ages. 5 Italy is currently pre-
dicted to have the highest median age at fifty-two.16 Japan will
reach fifty, with most other developed countries, and some Asian
countries, attaining median ages over forty.
1 7
The public perception of "aging" is a European and North
American issue. However, in terms of sheer numbers, Europe
and the United States fall low on the list of old societies. Already
two-thirds of the world's older population lives in developing
regions, and that population is estimated to reach one billion
within twenty years and to approach two billion by 2050.18 In
contrast, Europe will have less than 200 million old people, and
the United States eighty-one million. 9 Similarly, of the almost
400 million people aged over eighty who will be living across the
globe by the middle of the century, only sixty-three million of
these will live in Europe2° and only thirty million in the United
States.21
I. THE IMPACT OF FALLING FERTILITY
Fertility has fallen consistently over the past fifty years, and
indeed dramatically over the past twenty years in developing
countries. 22 Once, the fear was of over-population. Now the pre-
dicted maximum world population is coming down, as across the
world women of child bearing years are both delaying starting a
family and reducing the number of children they bear.23
The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is the average number of chil-
dren born to each woman of child bearing age. In Europe, this
15. HARPER, supra note 4, at 9.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. HARPER, supra note 4, at 30-31.
19. EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET, supra note 5 (predicting that by
2030 19.6% of the United States and 24.7% of the European Union will be over
65).
20. U.N. Department of Economic & Social Affairs, Population Division,
World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision, Populations Ageing 7 tbl.3 (March
2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wpp2006/
wpp2006_- ageing.pdf.
21. U.N. Department of Economic & Social Affairs, Population Division,
World Population Prospects: The 2006 Revision: Highlights 4, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/
WP.202 (March 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publica-
tions/wpp2006/wpp2006-highlights.pdf.
22. See U.N. World Population Prospects 2004, supra note 1, at 64.
23. See HARPER, supra note 4, at 167-70; EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC DATA
SHEET, supra note 5.
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fell from around three children per reproductive woman to
below two in the second half of the twentieth century.2 4 In order
to replace a population by births, we need just over two children
to be born per woman. By the end of the 1970s Europe had
stopped replacing its population through births. 25 Europe is cur-
rently averaging around one and a half children per European
reproductive woman, with the southern Mediterranean countries
of Italy and Spain at 1.3, and Sweden and France just below two
at 1.8 and 1.88 respectively.26 The United States has managed to
retain its TFR at around replacement, currently standing at 2.1.27
This has been boosted by its young immigrant populations.
What has been so surprising, however, is the dramatic fall in fer-
tility in developing regions, especially in Asia. TFR in Korea is at
1.2 and Singapore now stands at 1.3, with a remarkable 0.9-that
is, less than one child per reproductive woman-in Hong
Kong.
28
It has long been argued that as societies and individuals
within those societies became wealthier, so the number of chil-
dren born would fall. This is because: increases in health care
mean that each child born has a better chance of surviving (so
women do not need to keep producing infants to ensure that at
least one will survive childhood); children become more expen-
sive due to the increased obligations which societies develop to
educate and provide for them; such societies provide better
opportunities for women to be educated, and thus learn about
and have access to contraception; and job opportunities in
wealthier societies enable women to go out into the work place
and be financially independent.29
However, the issue becomes more complex in advanced eco-
nomic societies. Currently, within Europe, there seems to be a
small rise in child bearing in those countries which make it easier
for women to have children and remain in the work place, such
as in Scandinavia, compared with a continued fall in childbear-
ing in those countries in which it is more difficult for women to
remain in the workplace while also having children, such as some
southern European countries.3 0
There is conflicting evidence as to the possibility of reversing
downward fertility trends. In some Scandinavian countries, for
24. HARPER, supra note 4, at 169.
25. Id. at 44.
26. EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET, supra note 5.
27. Id.
28. U.N. World Population Prospects 2004, supra note 1, at 67-71.
29. HARPER, supra note 4, at 44-46.
30. Id. at 46.
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example, so called "positive parenting policies"-enabling
women to remain active in the work place and bring up their
children-seem to have had an effect, with births increasing,
though still remaining below replacement level.31 The French
government has also now been able to raise the Total Fertility
Rate through a series of policies, such as financial incentives, spe-
cifically aimed at encouraging women to have more children. 2
There are some demographers, however, who suggest that once a
country's total fertility rate has fallen below one and a half births
per woman, it is difficult for it to recover. This is because so
many couples are either childless or with only one child, that hav-
ing no children or one child only becomes the norm, and
neighbourhoods and communities start to adapt to this.
II. FALLING MORTALITY AND INCREASING LONGEVITY
It is not only falling fertility which is resulting in the aging of
world populations-longevity is indeed increasing. Fifty years
ago life expectancy at birth was around sixty-five years of life in
Europe, and a mere forty years in many developing countries.33
When state pensions were developed for all workers in Europe,
and age sixty-five was selected as the state pension age in most
countries, average life expectancy for male manual workers was
only another four years at sixty-nine!3 4 Today life expectancy at
birth has reached the mid-to-late seventies across the developed
world, and the mid-to-late sixties in most developing countries.35
The United States has mid-range life expectancy in relation to
other Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries at seventy-five for men and 80.8 for
women.3 6 This compares, for example, with eighty-eight for Jap-
anese and French women. Therefore, at age sixty men and
women in the United States can expect to live a further fifteen to
twenty years.
These two developments, falling fertility on the one hand
and falling mortality-or increasing longevity-on the other,
have led to the so-called maturing of European societies. Europe
31. See id.
32. For changes in the Total Fertility Rate for France, see U.N. World
Population Prospects 2004, supra note 1, at 68.
33. See id. at 11.
34. See HARPER, supra note 4, at 94-95.
35. U.N. World Population Prospects 2004, supra note 1, at 10; HARPER,
supra note 4, at 49.
36. EUROPEAN DEMOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET, supra note 5; HARPER, supra
note 4, at 51.
37. Id.
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became demographically mature at the millennium when the
percentage of those over sixty exceeded those under fifteen."8 It
is historically unprecedented for a society to have more old than
young people. But it is a trend that is expected to flow across the
globe. By 2015 the United States will be mature, and by 2040
there will be more older than younger people in Asia.39 South
America will follow soon after.4 °
What is also of particular significance is the speed at which
this population aging is occurring. It took roughly one hundred
fifty years for Europe to move from a young to an old region;
Asia will become old in less than twenty-five years.41 While
Europe had the time to develop the institutions needed to sup-
port older people, many countries in Asia and Latin America are
still afflicted with poverty, famine, and lack of access to basic sani-
tation and fresh water.42 They are still grappling with high levels
of infant and maternal mortality and acute infectious diseases.
Now, at the same time, they are confronting the challenges of the
need for long term care and economic security for a growing
older population. 41 Many of these countries have only scant pub-
lic institutions and welfare regimes to cope with the current dem-
ographic profile of predominantly children and young adults.
Now they are facing the urgent necessity of developing appropri-
ate institutions and regimes for the one billion older adults who
will be surviving over the next twenty-five years.44
III. THE INVERTED PYRAMID
Some people are tending to think of population aging as a
transitory effect-a baby boom or age wave. When the baby
boomers die off, or the age wave subsides, then it will all return
to normal. Yet this is highly unlikely to be the case. What we
appear to be seeing is a fundamental shift in the demographic
structure of society. No longer will it be the norm to have large
numbers of young and small numbers of old. Rather, we are
38. HARPER, supra note 4, at 5.
39. Id.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 5-6.
42. See, e.g., HELPAGE INTERNATIONAL: AU POLICY FRAMEWORK AND PLAN
OF AcrION ON AGEING (2002), available at www.helpage.org/Resources/Policy
reports/maincontent/1118337558011/AUFrameworkBook.pdf.
43. Id. at 5; Nana Araba Hapt, Ageing and the Changing Role of the Family
and the Community: An African Perspective, 55 INT'L Soc. SECURITy REV. 39, 43
(2002).
44. HARPER, supra note 4, at 1.
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entering a world where age groups will be distributed more or
less equally across society-an age-symmetric society.
We have all grown up with the image in our heads of the
population pyramid-that is, a pyramid shape which has large
numbers of young people at the bottom, tapering to very few old
people at the top. This pyramid is currently being inverted.
Think instead of a V-shaped, or upside down pyramid. This has
more older people at the top than younger people at the
bottom!
The conventional population pyramid is at present in the
process of being reversed, so that for the first time in history,
some countries-and Japan provides a key example here-will
for a short while actually experience an inverted pyramid shape
to their population pyramid-a Japanese V.4" Current predic-
tions lead us eventually to a skyscraper divided equally into
floors, each floor a decade of life, and each floor having roughly
10% of the population.46 In other words, 10% of the population
aged below ten, 10% aged twenty to thirty, 10% aged thirty to
forty, and so on, up to one hundred years and possibly longer
given current medical and technological advances. This is the
success of population aging. For it means that for the first time
in history, we shall be able to experience three, four, and even
five generations all alive and contributing at the same time-in
families, in the work place, and in the community.47
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS AND SOCIETIES
The common public concept of 'aging' has been one of an
increased requirement to provide health and social service deliv-
ery to older people.48 Yet this change in our population struc-
ture will also have significant implications for the way we live, the
way we work, public services and health care, private and public
benefit systems, families, communities, patterns of saving and
consumption, provision of housing and transport, our education
systems, even, it has been argued, the geopolitical order of the
new century.49 The "knock on" effects of such population
restructuring will be significant.
45. Id. at 11.
46. Id. at 10-11.
47. See Sarah Harper, The Challenge for Families of Demographic Ageing, in
FAmILwS IN AGEING SOCIETIEs 6, 18-19 (Sarah Harper ed., 2004) [hereinafter
Harper, The Challenge for Families].
48. HARPER, supra note 4, at 1.
49. Id.
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There is a commonly accepted understanding of generational
succession, for example. That is the passing of assets, power, and
advice down through the generations. The continual turnover of
generations-the replacement of old generations by new genera-
tions-has an important role to play in maintaining different
social institutions.
The system works because older generations grow old and
die and pass on their inheritance to their descendants. This
works to a particular rhythm. Fundamental change in estab-
lished patterns of generational succession may lead to radical dis-
ruption in these institutions and have adverse effects on
intergenerational solidarity. What will happen if there are not
three generations, but five all alive and active at the same time?
What if individuals find themselves in their eighties before they
inherit from their parents or even-if longevity continues-from
their grandparents? There will be a need to rethink the way the
generations operate in the light of increasingly common longer
lives.
Yet the lengthening of living generations is important cultur-
ally. It links us to our past for a longer period of time. There is a
certain sadness with the passing of the generations. In Britain,
when the last British soldier who had played in the German/Brit-
ish Christmas Football match of the First World War died, there
was a collective feeling of loss of something in our history.5"
What is the impact on individuals as they realize the poten-
tial of life spans that may take them well into the ninth or even
tenth decade? There is a clear increase in the age at which peo-
ple go through life transitions, with all Western style aging socie-
ties displaying an increase of age at first marriage and at
remarriage, at leaving the parental home, and at first child-
birth.51 "While public and legal institutions may be lowering the
age threshold into full legal adulthood, individuals themselves
are choosing to delay many of those transitions which demon-
strate a commitment to full adulthood-full economic indepen-
dence from parents, formal adult union through marriage or
committed long-term cohabitation, and parenting."52 As I have
commented elsewhere, "[i]t can be argued, for example, that
because early death through disease, war, famine, and, for
women, reproduction, is no longer the common experience,
50. See, e.g., Frank Urquhart, Last Veteran of World War One Dies at 109, THE
SCOTSMAN, Nov. 22, 2005, available at http://news.scotsman.com/scoland.cfm?
id=2279822005.
51. Harper, The Challenge for Families, supra note 47, at 6-7.
52. Id. at 7.
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individuals feel more comfortable about establishing marital
unions later in life and bearing children later.
53
V. THE MYTHS OF DEMOGRAPHIC BURDEN
As governments and policy makers have awakened to the
implications of population aging, so the "demographic burden
hypothesis" has spread.54 In particular, it is a component of cur-
rent political rhetoric that health services throughout the West-
ern world are collapsing under the strain of demographic
aging.55 "Policy makers in much of Europe and the United
States for example have expressed deep concerns with regard to
the increasing pressure on health and social care costs arising
from the demographic aging of their populations."56 It is gener-
ally accepted that projected health care costs across the OECD
countries, which currently spend 8.8% of joint GDP on health
care, 57 are not sustainable. Highest are Germany with 11%, Swit-
zerland with 11.5%, and the United States with 15% of GDP.5s
Indeed, long-term United States forecasts predict that by the year
2030 almost 33% of GDP will be accounted for by health care.59
However, as Leeson has pointed out, although a number of
cross-national studies have considered the determinants of
health care costs, only one has found that the age structure
of the population, that is the proportion of population
aged sixty-five and over being taken as the age structure
indicator, is an explanatory factor alongside the effects of
income, lifestyle characteristics, and environmental factors.6 °
Take the United States for example. Here, the costs on Medicare
rose between 1970 and 1999 from $35 billion61 in 1970 to $213
billion by 1999.62 Medicare alone accounted for 2.4% of GDP in
53. Id.
54. HARPER, supra note 4, at 19.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 20.
57. See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOP-
MENT, OECD IN FIGURES 2006-2007, at 8-9 (2006), http://213.253.134.43/
oecd/pdfs/browseit/0106061E.pdf.
58. Id.
59. Sally T. Burner et al., National Health Expenditures Projections Through
2030, 14 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1, 14 (1992).
60. HARPER, supra note 4, at 20.
61. Figure converted to 1999 dollar equivalents.
62. Ronald Lee & John Haaga, Government Spending in an Older America, in
REPORTS ON AMERICA, May 2002, at 1, 7-8 (Population Reference Bureau, Vol.
3, No. 1), http://www.prb.org/Content/ContentGroups/Report/025/Report
onAmericaGovtSpendng.pdf.
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1999.63 Over that time, however, while the number of enrollees
doubled, the expenditure per enrollee quadrupled.6 4 The fore-
cast increase in Medicare expenditure, to reach 3.9% of GDP by
2013, is notjust due to rising numbers of older people, but to the
expected increase in expenditure per enrollee. 65
VI. IMMIGRATION AND AGING WORKFORCES
It is clear that the emerging demographic imbalances arising
from the differential movement of regions into maturity provide
a key stimulus to the international flows of human and economic
capital. Indeed, it is now recognised that one of the key drivers
of international migration is the differential aging of societies, as
high fertility countries, still with high numbers of young workers,
send migrants to low fertility countries with growing labour
shortages. The movement of capital out of more aging regions,
to younger, faster growing transitional and developing econo-
mies could aid in their economic development, while the move-
ment of young workers into the more demographically mature
regions could compensate for their own fertility downfall.66 Ken-
neth Howse, Senior Research Fellow at the Oxford Institute of
Ageing and Editor of Ageing Horizons, takes this point further and
suggests that,
If aging societies are able to export capital to areas that are
in need of it and import people from areas that have a 'sur-
plus', it may prove possible not just to turn the increasing
integration of the world economy to their advantage, but
to do so in a way that enhances welfare for everyone.67
There is thus a growing acceptance that the international move-
ment of economic and human capital, in the form of investment
from aging developed nations to developing and transitional
economies, with goods and services flowing back to the more
developed world will provide important mechanisms to moderate
the effects of population aging.
Of key importance, however, is the upcoming skills shortage
over the next twenty years. The competition for skills is going to
63. Id. at 8.
64. Id.
65. Deutsche Bank Research, Major US Health Care Reform-Demographic
and Budgetary Dimensions, CuRRENT ISSuES, Feb. 9, 2004, at 1, available at http://
www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBRINTERNETEN-PROD/PRODO00000000
073633.pdf.
66. STEVEN A. NYCE & SYLVESTERJ. SCHIEBER, THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS
OF AGING SOCIETIES 210 (2005); HARPER, supra note 4, at 111-12.
67. Kenneth Howse, Globalisation and Global Ageing, AGEING HORIZONS,
Spring-Summer 2006, at 1, 2.
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be acute across the world. For several decades now, the United
States has increasingly relied on migration and migrant labour to
compensate for its own skills shortage, as has Europe. However,
the degree of replacement migration needed to fully compensate
for lack of young workers is now agreed to be unattainable.6"
The United States, for example, needs to admit an additional five
million immigrants per year (four times current level) in order
to achieve long term balance in the Social Security trust fund,
while to maintain the current ratio of workers to dependents by
2020, the United States will need an additional ninety-five mil-
lion more people of working age-more than entire working
population of Mexico!69
As we have earlier discussed, however, the current flows will
be disrupted during this time, as the rapid aging of developing
economies, in particular of some Asian economies, will require
investment flows of both finance and skilled labor themselves. It
is likely that the migration of both these forms of capital will flow
in increasingly more diverse patterns, and that the developed
world in particular cannot rely on continued flows of human cap-
ital to compensate for its own fertility fall.
In particular, developing and transitional economies will
need to retain their skilled workers themselves. Furthermore,
these countries, especially those in Asia, will also begin to com-
pete with Europe and the United States as magnets for labor. In
particular, the government of China is ahead of all other govern-
ments in that it has predicted the age structure of all its occupa-
tions, and it knows for every occupation in which year the labour
shortage will hit.7° It is thus predicted that first China will attract
skilled workers from throughout Asia, thus competing with the
West for these workers, and then attract workers from Europe
and even the United States. 71 By 2030 it has been suggested the
so-called "brain drain" will reverse from the United States to
China.72
If the United States and European countries can in the
future no longer rely on a steady stream of skilled migrants, one
alternative is to encourage and enable men and women to stay
actively employed in the labor market for longer. One conse-
quence of the bigger picture of population aging is that individu-
68. For a discussion of this trend in Europe, see generally Serge Feld,
Labor Force Trends and Immigration in Europe, 39 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 637
(2005); see also HARPER, supra note 4, at 111.
69. Lee & Haaga, supra note 62, at 5.
70. IBM Seminar, Paris, Manpower, 2005 Ageing Workforces (Nov. 2005).
71. Id.
72. Id.
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als will all have to work longer, maybe throughout their sixties
and even into their early seventies. This is not only due to the
difficulty of supporting oneself to up to forty years post employ-
ment, but also because the skills and expertise of older workers
will be increasingly valued and needed as the youth labor
shortage starts to be felt.
VII. THE REALITY OF POPULATION AGING
Population aging is a reality-and one that is unlikely to be
reversed. It is affecting us all-our life courses, families, commu-
nities, and work places. The drivers behind this change-falling
mortality or increasing longevity-and falling fertility- should
both be seen as successes.
Increased longevity is a great success. For a society to have
achieved a long and healthy lifespan, with a high probability that
most individuals born will live to achieve the natural human life
span in good health and limited frailty, this must surely be a
major achievement of civilization. Indeed, to have this achieved
throughout the world would surely be the achievement of civiliza-
tion. For then we would have also conquered poverty, disease,
famine and war throughout the world, these still being the major
killers for most people.
But we should also grasp falling fertility as a success. At the
individual level, millions of women in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, are relieved from the burden of multiple pregnancies,
maternal deaths, and endless infant mortality. And for the world
as a whole-falling fertility has already meant that a world head-
ing for some twelve billion people at the end of the century now
faces nine billion and falling.
73
Older people, at least in the West, should not fear the
future. They should be valued and needed members of society.
Governments and employers need to work together to ensure
policies and practices to enable the recruitment, retention, and
retraining of older men and women, whose skills, expertise, and
experience is so valuable to our economies.
Today's young need not fear the future either. In a future
world of scarce skilled labor, they are a valuable commodity-
with a huge international labor market eager to attract such
scarce skilled workers.
Aging societies need all their healthy, active members to
contribute throughout their active lives so that resources can be
shifted to care for frailer, disabled dependents of whatever age.
73. See generally U.N. World Population Prospects 2004, supra note 1.
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The key question of this next century is: Are we entering a world
of old people, or a world where people simply live longer? The
indications are that we are entering the latter, and with the right
policies and frameworks, that world can be a successful one.

